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　1.　Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a subsidiary 
policy aiming to promote a socially preferable 
product, and it discusses the problem of decreasing 
product variety caused by the subsidy—that is, the 
problem of missing products. Granting a subsidy on 
a product enables society to promote the preferable 
product not only by its lowering consumer price, 
but also by inducing withdrawal of other products 
from the market. However, such withdrawal, that 
is, missing products, reduces the pressure of 
market competition on the remaining products and 
increases these products’ prices. The problem of 
missing products also serves to deter potential new 
products from entering the market; this hinders 
product innovation. Thus, when we discuss subsidy 
policies, it is important to consider the problem 
of missing products. However, to the author’s 
knowledge, no paper has yet addressed the problem 
of missing products and subsidy policies.
There are similar problems to that of missing 
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products, for example, the problem of the missing 
middle and the problem of notches. First, the 
problem of missing middle occurs when favorable 
tax treatments are endowed on small-size firms 
under a taxation policy in which the tax amounts are 
determined by firm size. Such a taxation approach 
reduces small-size firms’ incentive to expand, and as 
a result, the number of middle-sized firms remains 
relatively small. Because such taxation structure 
inhibits small-sized firm from expansion, effective 
economic growth cannot be attained (Chetty et al., 
2011; Dharmapala et al, 2011). That is, if preferential 
tax treatment is bestowed on a certain target, then, 
because growth of such target may be restrained, 
such special treatment may not be able to improve 
social welfare.
Second, the problem of notches occurs when 
product characteristics cross a tax bracket threshold 
and the amount of tax changed discontinuously 
(see Slemrod, 2013). Because notches exert strong 
ef fects on product development, governments 
can utilize taxation with notches strategically to 
improve social welfare. In this regard, Arakawa 
(2014) analyzes the effects of commodity taxation 
with tax brackets under a vertically differentiated 
mul t ip r oduc t  monopo ly.  He  shows  tha t  a 
government can improve the quality of all products 
by inducing the lowest quality product to be 
bounded on threshold of a tax bracket and moving 
the tax threshold in the direction of improving 
product quality. In the automobile industry, for 
example, Sallee and Slemrod (2012) analyzed 
fuel economy policies in the U.S. and Canada and 
showed that many automobiles are produced on 
the socially preferable sides of tax brackets. Ito and 
Sallee (2014) analyze the relationship between tax 
brackets and distribution of automobiles weights in 
the Japanese automobile industry. They show that 
tax brackets increase automobile weights, resulting 
in worse fuel economy and increased damage in 
automobile accidents. Thus, the development of 
new cars is strongly af fected by notches under 
taxation with tax brackets, and then the new car is 
developed on the preferable side of the tax bracket. 
However, from another perspective, such taxation 
serves to deter development on the other side of 
the tax bracket. Furthermore, though it depends 
on the taxation system settings, socially preferable 
innovation may be inhibited.1) Therefore, the 
problem of notches shares aspects with the problem 
of missing products.
In this paper, we use a circular city type of 
monopolistic competition model based on that of 
Salop (1979) to (1) analyze effects of a subsidiary 
policy on social welfare and withdrawal level of 
products from market, and (2) discuss the problem 
of missing products under a subsidy policy. An 
optimal subsidy policy proposed in the present 
paper counsels granting higher subsidies on more 
socially preferable products. This policy induces 
withdrawal of other products, and hence product 
variety in the market decreases. Although such a 
measure promotes the socially preferable product 
more effectively, because decreased product variety 
lowers market pressure from competition among 
products, the price of the socially preferable product 
increases. Thus, higher subsidies are required, 
and as a result, the social cost of funding the 
subsidy increases. Therefore, an excessive subsidy 
decreases product variety more than necessary and 
raises prices of remaining products due to reduced 
market pressure arising from product variety. The 
problem of missing products within the subsidy 
policy may worsen social welfare.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section, we show the model. In section 3, we derive 
the equilibrium for a given subsidy amount. In 
Section 4, we define the social welfare function 
and obtain the first-best allocation. In Section 5, 
we obtain social-welfare-maximizing subsidy levels 
under the assumption that firms determine product 
prices. In Section 6, we discuss the problem of 
2
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missing products with an optimal subsidy policy. 
Finally, in Section 7, we conclude.
　2.　Model
The model’s settings in this paper are as follows. 
There are four types of products in the markets, 
and each product is produced by a different firm. 
Let the price of Product i produced by firm i be 
.pi  Products are differentiated in terms of product 
characteristics, that is, they are dif ferentiated 
horizontally.2) One of the products has socially 
preferable product characteristics, and government 
aims to effectively promote the product. However, 
because consumers do not consider such social 
desirability, demand for the product is below the 
socially optimal level. Therefore, the government 
takes step to grant a subsidy to consumers who buy 
the product.
We construct a model to analyze a subsidy policy 
with the above settings using the circular-city-
type of monopolistic competition model proposed 
by Salop (1979).  Consumers are uniformly 
distributed on a circle, which has a perimeter of 
one. Consumers travel along the circle by incurring 
quadratic transpor t costs. That is, consumers 
traveling a distance x incur the cost tx2 , where 
t  is a transportation parameter. A consumer buys 
one unit of the product from which he obtains the 
largest net surplus; he does not buy any products if 
no product gives him a positive net surplus. 
Firms are located around the circle and incur 
only marginal cost c for producing the product. 
Because we assume here a short-run situation, we 
do not consider fixed costs. Within a competitive 
environment, only firms that obtain positive profits 
remains in the market, while others withdraw. While 
all firms compete with each other, each firm directly 
competes with both sides of neighborhoods.3) 
Our model is organized as the following three-
stage game: in the status quo, there are four 
products in the market. In the first stage, the 
government decides the amount of subsidy s . In the 
second stage, each firm decides whether to remain 
in the market or not. In the third stage, remaining 
firms decide product prices. Here we assume that 
product characteristics, that is, the locations of 
firms, are determined exogenously. More precisely, 
the four products in the status quo are located 
symmetrically, i.e., equidistantly around the circle. 
The locations of the remaining products in the 
second stage are assumed to be unchanged. That is, 
because we consider a short-run situation, granting 
a subsidy does not affect product development.
The government grants subsidy s to a consumer 
who buys one unit of product. That is, for each 
purchased product, a predetermined amount of 
subsidy is granted to purchasers. In this sense, 
the subsidy can be considered as subsidy version 
of a specific commodity tax.4) Let us assume that 
Product 1 has a socially preferable characteristic, 
and the government aims to promote the product 
by granting a subsidy. 
　3.　Equilibrium
In this section, we obtain an equilibrium given the 
amount of subsidy and number of products. That is, 
we analyze the third stage of the game. 
3.1　Case of four products
Demand levels for each product are determined 
by locations of consumers who are indif ferent 
between adjacent products. Let xij  be a location of 
a consumer who is indifferent between Products i 
and j , and it is measured from Product i. Solving 
following equations simultaneously 
( / ) ,p s tx p t x1 41 12
2
2 12
2- + = + -
( / ) ,p tx p t x1 4 23
2 2
2 23 3+ = + -
( / ) ,p tx p t x1 4
2 2
4 34 3 34+ = + -
( / ) ,p s tx p t x1 41 1
2
1
2
4 4 4- + = + - 　　　　　
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we obtain locations of indif ferent consumers as 
follows:
,x
t
p p s t
8
16 16 16
12
1 2
=
- + + +
,x
t
p p t
8
16 162 3
23=
- + +
16 16
,x
t
p p t
8
34
3 4
=
+-
.x
t
p p s t
8
16 16 16
14
1 4
=
- + + +
Based on the above locations, we obtain demand for 
each product as follows:
, ,D x x D x x
4
1
1 12 14 2 12 23= + = - +
, ,D x x D x x
2
1
4
4
1
13 23 34 4 34= - = - +-
where Di  is demand for Product i. Firm i’s profit 
ir is obtained as
( ) .p c Di i ir = -  (1)
By dif ferentiating profit functions with respect 
to product prices for each firm, equating those 
equations to zero, and solving them simultaneously, 
we obtain following solutions:
, ,p c
s
p p c
st t
12
5
16 16 6
1 2 4= + + = = + -  (2)
,p c
t s
16 12
3= + -
, .x x
t
s
x x
t
s
8
1
6 8
1
6
5
12 14 23 34= = + = = +
From the above solutions, we find that as the 
subsidy on Product i increases, the price of Product 
1 increases, while prices of other products decrease. 
Furthermore, when the subsidy amount increases, 
demand for Products 1 and 3 increases, while 
that for other products decreases. In sum, as the 
subsidy amount rises, Firms 2 and 4 face difficulties 
in setting a product price above the marginal cost; 
they also struggle to obtain demand for their 
products. In the following, we derive a condition for 
existence of the four products.
First, let us consider the conditions needed 
for Products 2 and 4 to have prices higher than 
marginal cost. From equation (2), we find that the 
condition is as follows:
.s
t
8
3
<
 (3)
Next, let us consider the conditions for Products 
2 and 4 to obtain market demand. In terms of 
Product 1, because /D 1 41=  if s 0= , and 
/ /( )D s t5 3 0>12 2 = , we do not have to consider 
the conditions. In terms of Product 2, /D 1 42=  if 
s 0= , and / /( )D s t2 3 0<22 2 =- . Furthermore, 
D 02=  if /s t3 8= . Thus, the condition for Product 
2 to obtain market demand is same as in equation 
(3). In terms of Product 3, /D 1 43=  if s 0= , and 
/ /( )D s t1 3 0<32 2 =- . Furthermore, D 03=  if 
/s t3 4= . Therefore, the condition for Product 3 to 
obtain market demand is /s t3 4< . Finally, in terms 
of Product 4, the condition of obtaining market 
demand is same as that of Product 2.
To summarize the above, the condition of 
existence for the four products is given by equation 
(3). If this condition cannot be met, Products 2 
and 4 have to withdraw from the market, and only 
Products 1 and 3 remain. In the status quo, that 
is, when no subsidy is granted, this condition 
is satisfied and the market accommodates four 
products. In other words, when the subsidy amount 
is relatively small, then because competitive 
advantage of Product 1 is not large, all products 
garner market demand. However, when the subsidy 
amount is relatively large, two products withdraw 
from the market under equation (2), and only two 
products remain in the market. 
3.2　Case of two products
Let us consider the case when the subsidy 
amount does not meet condition (3), that is, when 
it is relatively large, the number of products may 
4
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be two. By using similar considerations to those 
employed in the four-product case, we obtain 
solutions with firm profit-maximizing behaviors as 
follows:
, ,p c
t s
p c
t s
4 3 4 3
1 3= + + = + -  (4)
.x
t
s
4
1
3
13= +
These solutions show that as the amount of subsidy 
increases, the price of Product 1 increases whereas 
that of Product 3 decreases. Fur thermore, by 
increasing the subsidy amount, demand for Product 
1 increases while that of Product 3 decreases. Thus, 
as with the four-product case, if the amount of 
subsidy increases, it is hard for the firm producing 
Product 3 to set a price higher than the marginal 
cost as well as to obtain market demand.
Let us obtain the condition where Product 3 can 
remain in the market. First, the condition where 
Product 3 can set a price higher than marginal cost 
is 
.s
t
4
3
<
 (5)
Next, the condition where Product 3 obtains market 
demand is derived as follows. In terms of Product 3, 
/D 1 43=  if /s t3 8= , and / /( ) .D s t2 3 0<32 2 =-  
Furthermore, D 03=  if /s t3 4= . Thus, the 
condition is same as in equation (5). In sum, if 
condition (5) is satisfied, the market is able to 
accommodate two products.
However, even if equation (5) is satisfied, there 
are possibility that Products 2 and 4 remain in the 
market. In this case, because four products exist in 
the market, prices of equation (4), derived under 
an assumption of two products, are not valid. Thus, 
we have to obtain condition such that only two 
products can remain. To do this, we have to check 
whether Products 2 and 4 remain in the market 
under equation (4).
Assuming that the market accommodates four 
products, and strategies of Product 1 and 3 are 
given in equation (4), we obtain the solution by 
maximizing profits of Products 2 and 4 as follows:
,p p c
t s
32
5
4
2 4= = + -
, .
t
s
x x
t
s
x x
16
1
6
5
16
5
6
12 23 3414= =- + = = -
These solutions show that when the amount of 
subsidy increases, prices and market demand of 
Products 2 and 4 decreases. Thus, we find that 
as the subsidy amount increases, it is difficult for 
either Product 2 or 4 to remain in the market.
Let us obtain the condition where the market 
accommodates two products. First, the condition 
where Products 2 and 4 are not be able to set 
their prices higher than marginal cost, that is, the 
condition of withdrawal for Products 2 and 4 is 
.s
t5
8
$
 (6)
Next, let us obtain a condition where only two 
products receive market demand. In terms of 
Product 1, because /D 1 21=  if /s t3 8= , and 
/ /( )D s t5 3 0>12 2 = , we do not have to consider 
this case. In terms of Product 2, /D 1 42=  if 
/s t3 8= , and / /D s t1 0<22 2 =- . Furthermore, 
D 02= if /s t5 8= . Thus, the condition where 
Product 2 obtain market demand is /s t5 8< . In 
terms of Product 3, because D 03=  if / ,s t3 8=  and 
/ /( )D s t1 3 0>32 2 = , we do not have to consider 
this case. In terms of Product 4, the condition is 
same as that of Product 2. Therefore, we find that 
the condition where only two products remain in the 
market is /s t5 8$ . In this case, unique equilibrium 
is given in equation (4). Thus, when /s t5 8$ , 
there are two products with equation (4). 
However, when /s t5 81 , because subsidy 
amount  i s  smal l ,  caus ing  the  compet i t ive 
advantage of Product 1 to decline, the market 
accommodates four products. Let us consider a 
case when / , /s t t3 8 5 8! g6 . As already discussed 
above, under equation (4) obtained with the 
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assumption of two products, because Product 2 and 
4 remain in the market, it is difficult for Product 3 
to obtain large market demand. Especially when 
/s t 83= , the market demand for Product 3 is zero. 
In this case, if Product 3 set a price lower than 
that indicated by equation (4), and holding market 
demand for Products 2 and 4 to zero, Products 2 
and 4 can be deterred from remaining in the market 
and Product 3 can obtain market demand. 
Reaction functions of Products 2 and 4 given the 
prices of Products 1 and 3 are 
( ) .p p c p p s t
32
1
16 8 8 82 4 1 3= = + + - +
The market demand of Products 2 and 4 are 
obtained as follows:
.D D
t
c p p s t
8
16 8 8 8
2 4
1 3
= =
- + + - +
To keep these demand levels equal to zero, prices 
of Products 1 and 3 have to satisfy the following 
condition:
.c p p s t16 8 8 8 01 3- + + - + =  (7)
If not satisfied, Products 2 and 4 remain in the 
market and the profits of Products 1 and 3 decrease. 
Under this condition, both Products 1 and 3 do 
not have incentive to change their prices. Thus, 
combinations of prices satisfying this condition 
can be considered equilibrium prices. Although 
there are innumerable combinations of equilibrium 
prices, let us obtain a range of prices for Product 3. 
First, the highest price is obtained as follows. For 
the two-product case, a consumer who is indifferent 
between the two products is
,x
t
p p s t
4
4 4 4
13
1 3
=
- + + +
and market demand for the two products is
, .D x D x2 1 21 13 3 13= = -
By solving D 03= , the highest price of Product 3 
is obtained as
.p p s
t
4
3 1= - +
Furthermore, by solving equation (7) and the above 
prices simultaneously, we have
, .p c s
t
p c
t
16
3
16
1 3= + - = +  (8)
Second, the lowest price of Product 3 is same as 
marginal cost. In this case, from equation (7), we 
have
, .p sc
t
p c
8
1 3= + - =
Because the market demand levels in this case are 
, ,D D
4
3
4
1
1 2= =
we find that the market demand cannot be affected 
by the subsidy amount. In sum, a range of prices for 
Product 3 are obtained as follows:
, / .p c c t 163! +6 @  (9)
Though combinations of equilibrium prices are 
restricted by the price range of equation (9), 
innumerable combinations of equilibrium prices 
remain. Because it is difficult to conduct advance 
research in this situation, we assume that the 
possible combinations of equilibrium prices are 
as in equation (8), that is, we assume that Product 
3 can set the highest price. The reason for this is 
as follows: we consider the situation in which the 
subsidy granted by the government changes the 
market structure from one with four products (i.e., 
the status quo) to a market with two products. While 
the prices in the status quo are /p p c t 161 2= = + , 
it is rational to assume that the prices do not change 
due to the subsidy. In this case, the changed price is 
the highest price according to equation (9). In other 
words, even if the market structure changes due 
to the subsidy, firms’ strategies are maintained as 
much as possible. 
In sum, there exists a unique equilibrium with 
two products; when / , /s t t3 8 5 8! g6 , the prices are 
determined by equation (8), and when / ,s t5 8$  the 
prices are determined by equation (4).　　　　　
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3.3　Case of one product
When the subsidy amount satisfies equation 
(6), that is, when it is relatively large, the market 
may accommodate only Product 1. In other words, 
when the subsidy amount is large, then, because 
the competitive advantage of Product 1 is too large, 
it is dif ficult for Product 3 to set a price higher 
than marginal cost and to obtain market demand. 
However, if Product 1 attempts to remain in the 
market alone and to set a significantly higher price, 
Product 3 can remain in the market. Thus, we 
maximize Product 1’s profit under the condition 
where Product 3’s profit is zero. However, even if 
Product 3 is expelled from the market, Products 2 
and 4 may remain in the market. Therefore, we also 
have to consider the condition where Products 2 
and 4 do not remain in the market. 
First, let us consider the situation when Product 3 
leaves the market. The reaction function of Product 
3 given the price of Product 1 is 
( ) .p c p s t
8
1
4 4 43 1= + - +
The price of Product 1 that maintains demand for 
Product 3 as zero is
.p c s
t
4
1= + -  (10)
This is the highest price of Product 1 to Product 3 
out of the market.
Next, let us consider the case when Products 2 
and 4 leave the market. The reaction functions of 
Products 2 and 4 given the price of Product 1 are
( ) .p p c p s t
112
1
80 32 32 512 4= = + - +
The price needed for Product 1 to keep Products 2 
and 4 out the market is 
.p sc
t
32
5
1= + -  (11)
This is the highest price that can be charged for 
Product 1 to keep Products 2 and 4 out the market. 
Because equation (10) is less than equation 
(11), the price of Product 1 where the market 
accommodates only Product 1 is given by equation 
(10). 
The following proposition is a summary of the 
above.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium in the third stage 
is as follows: (i) When /s t3 8< , the market 
accommodates four products and product prices are 
given by equation (2); (ii) when / , / ,s t t3 8 5 8! g6  
the market accommodates two products and 
prices are given by equation (8); (iii) when 
/ , / ,s t t85 3 4! g6 ,  there are two products  in 
the market, and their prices are determined by 
equation (4); and (iv) when /s t3 4$ , only one 
product remain in the market and its price is given 
by equation (10).
This proposition shows that if the subsidy amount 
and competitive advantage of Product 1 increase, 
the other products are induced to quit the market. 
It is not difficult to understand this result, and we 
find that the subsidy serves to promote the socially 
beneficial product. However, note that when the 
subsidy amount increases and the other products 
withdraw the market, price of Product 1 increases 
discontinuously.5) This is because, depending on 
price increase, granting the subsidy may worsen 
social welfare. This point, i.e., the problem of 
missing products, will be discussed in Section 6.　
　4.　Social welfare
We define social welfare (SW) as the sum of 
surpluses from both consumers and firms. Because 
social welfare dif fers depending on the number 
of products, we analyze social welfare for each 
number of products. Furthermore, we obtain social 
welfare under the status quo and also derive first-
best allocation attained by a social planner.
First, let us consider the scenario when the 
market accommodates four products. In this case, 
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consumer surplus (CS) is obtained as follows:
( )CS V p s tx dx
x
1
2
0
12
= - + - +#
( )V p s tx dx
x
1
2
0
14
+ - + - +#
( )V p tx dx
/ x
2
0
1 4
2
12
- - ++
-#
( ) ( )V p tx dx V p tx dx
/x x
2
2
0
3
2
0
1 423 23
+ - - + - - +
-# #
( )V p tx dx
/ x
2
0
1 4
3
34
+ - - +
-#
( )V p tx dx
/ x
0
1 4
4
14
+ - - +
-#
( ) ,V p tx dx
x
0
4
34
+ - -#
whereV is the utility that a consumer derives from one 
unit of product, and a is a parameter representing a 
degree of positive externality exerted by Product 1. 
The amount of positive externality (PE) is defined 
as
( ) .PE a x x12 14= +
Firms’, surpluses coincide with sum of firms’ profits, 
that is, the sum of equation (1). Let us assume that 
fund of the subsidy is a social cost (SS)6):
( ) .SS s x x12 14= +
In sum, social welfare is defined as follows:
.SW CS SC PEiir= + - +!  (12)
We omit the derivation of SW for the two and one 
product cases because they are derived similarly to 
the four-product case. 
To measure the effect of the subsidy, we have 
to compare the situation with and without the 
subsidy. Thus, we derive SW without the subsidy 
in the following. Note that the status quo has four 
products. Substituting equation (2) into equation 
(12), and setting the subsidy to zero, we have
.SW
a
c
t
V
4 192
= - - +
Let us obtain the first-best allocation derived by 
a social planner as a benchmark. In the first-best 
allocation, the social planner maximizes SW by 
setting all product prices equal to marginal cost. 
First, let us consider the case of four products. In 
this case, the social-welfare-maximizing amount of 
subsidy is obtained as 
.s a=
The demand for products are obtained as 
, , .D
t
a
D D
t
a
D
4
1 4
4
1 2
4
1
1 2 4 3= + = = - =
 (13)
From equation (13), we find that when /ta 8$ , 
the market demand for Products 2 and 4 becomes 
zero. That is, if the positive externality exerted by 
Product 1 is relatively larger than the transport 
parameter, it is socially preferable to induce 
Products 2 and 4 to withdraw from the market. 
Thus, we find that the first-best allocation with four 
product exists if /ta 8< . In this case, we have
.SW
a
c
t
a t
V
4
2
192
2
= - + - +
 (14)
Next, let us consider the case when the market 
accommodates two products. The subsidy amount 
that maximizes SW is 
s a=
The market demand levels in this case are
, .D
t
a
D
t
a
2
1 2
2
1 2
1 3= + = -  (15)
From equation (15), if /ta 4$ , we find that the 
market demand for Product 3 is zero. That is, when 
the positive externality from Product 1 is relatively 
large, we find that it is socially preferable for only 
Product 1 to remain in the market. Thus, the first-
best allocation with two products exists if /ta 4< . 
In this case, we have
.SW
a
c
t
a t
V
2 48
2
= - + - +
 (16)
Finally, when the market accommodates only 
Product 1, SW is obtained as follows7):
.SW a c
t
V
12
= - - +  (17)
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While we have considered the number of 
product as a given, if social planner can control the 
number of products, we have to derive the socially 
preferable number of products. By analyzing the 
relationship between number of products and social 
welfare, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. In the first-best allocation, all 
product prices are set as marginal cost and the 
subsidy amount is same as the degree of Product 
1’s positive externality. Fur thermore (i) when 
, /a t0 8! g6 ,  the market accommodates four 
products; (ii) when / , /a t t8 4! g6 , there are two 
products in the market; and (iii) when /a t 4$ , 
only one product can remain in the market.
Proof. First, by comparing the first-best with four 
products [equation (14)] and that with two products 
[equation (16)], we find that when /a t 8< , equation 
(14) is larger than equation (16).  Next,  by 
comparing the first-best with four products 
[equation (16)] and that with two products 
[equation (17)], we find that when /a t 4< , equation 
(16) is larger than equation (17).  Q.E.D.
The first-best allocation shows that as Product 
1’s positive externality of increases, it is socially 
preferable to decrease the number of products 
remaining in the market. That is, in the relationship 
between degree of posit ive exter nality and 
consumer transpor t costs, even if the socially 
preferable product is not suitable for consumer 
preferences, it is socially preferable to induce 
consumers to buy the socially preferable product.
　5.　Optimal subsidy policy
In the first-best allocation, the social planner sets 
product prices equal to the marginal cost. However, 
when product prices are set by the firms, because 
firms attempt to set their prices higher than the 
marginal cost, even if the government grants a 
subsidy to control the market, it is dif ficult to 
achieve the first-best allocation. Thus, to measure 
the effect of a subsidy policy, we have to consider a 
realistic situation, that is, the second-best allocation 
where the firms determine their prices while the 
government grants a subsidy to consumers.
5.1　 Subsidy policy for a given number of 
products
The market structure dif fers according to the 
number of products existing in that market. Thus, 
as the first-best allocation, we first analyze the 
subsidy policy for a given number of products, 
and next, we obtain the second-best allocation by 
comparing the social welfare, that is, we obtain the 
optimal subsidy policy.8)
(a) Case of four products
Substituting equation (2) into equation (12), and 
differentiating the obtained equation with respect to 
price, we have following subsidy amount:
.s
a
13
30
=  (18)
Prices in this case are as follows:
, ,p c
t a
p p c
a
16 26
25
16
1
13
5
1 2 4= + + = = + -
.p c
t a
16 26
5
3= + -
These results show that as the positive externality 
increases, prices of all products except Product 1 
decrease. The condition where Products 2 and 4 
can set their prices higher than marginal costs is
.a
t
80
13
<  (19)
Thus, only when the positive exter nality is 
sufficiently lower than the transport parameter can 
the market accommodates four products. From 
equations (18) and (19), we find that the condition 
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in which four products can be accommodated in 
the market presented in Proposition 1, /s t3 8< , 
is satisfied. Thus, if equation (19) is satisfied, the 
subsidy amount of equation (18) can be equilibrium. 
In this case, we have
.SW
a
c
t
a t
V
4 13
25
192
2
= - + - +  (20)
Note that if equation (19) is not satisfied, there are 
no equilibria with four products under equation (18).
(b) Case of two products
From Proposition 1, the equilibria are divided into 
two types according to the subsidy amount. First, 
let us consider when ./ , /s t t3 8 5 8! g6  Substituting 
equation (8) into the SW function, we have
.SW a c
t
V
12
= - - +
 (21)
Because equation (21) does not include s , we 
find that the subsidy amount does not affect social 
welfare.
N e x t ,  l e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c a s e  w h e n 
/ , /s t t5 8 3 4! g6 . By substituting prices into the 
SW function and differentiating obtained equation 
with respect to the subsidy amount, we have
.s a3=  (22)
Prices in this case are
, .p c
t
a p c
t
a
4 4
1 3= + + = + -
The condition in which Product 3 remains in the 
market is
.a
t
4
<  (23)
From equations (22) and (23), we find that the 
condition in which two products remain in the 
market, i.e., the one presented by Proposition 1, 
/ , /s t t5 8 3 4! g6 , is satisfied. Thus, equation (22) 
can be an equilibrium. In this case, we have
.SW
a
c
t
a t
V
2 48
2
= - + - +  (24)
Note that if equation (23) is not satisfied, there are 
no equilibria with two products under equation (22).
(c) Case of one product               
From Proposition 1, equilibrium price of Product 
1 is given by equation (10). In this case we have
.SW a c
t
V
12
= - - +
5.2　Optimal subsidy
Here, we obtain optimal subsidy policy for the 
situation in which the government can control the 
number of product in the market. From the above 
analysis, we have following proposition.
Proposition 3. The optimal subsidy policy is as 
follows: (i) when , /ta 130 80! g6 , four products 
remain in the market with /s a30 13= ; (ii) when 
/ , /t ta 80 413! g6 , the market accommodates two 
products with s a3= ; and (iii) when /a t 4$ , only 
one product remains in the market with /s t3 4$ .
Proof. First, by comparing equations (20) and (21), 
equation (20) is larger under the range of equation 
(19). Next, by comparing equations (21) and (24), 
equation (24) is larger under the range of equation 
(23).  Q.E.D.
Let us consider the optimal subsidy case in 
more detail. As the positive externality increases, 
the subsidy amount increases, and the price of 
Product 1 also increases. This coincides with our 
intuition. However, because not all but only some 
portion of the subsidy contributes to the profit of 
Firm 1, the subsidy amount must rise. That is, if 
the government grants a subsidy for purchases of a 
socially preferable product, because the product’s 
producer raises the price by taking the subsidy for 
granted, the government will have to grant a larger 
subsidy. However, the problem further impacts the 
market as follows.
If the competitive advantage of Product 1 
increases, then because other products have lost 
market power and they are induced to withdraw 
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from the market. In addition, if the positive 
externality of Product 1 increases, it is socially 
preferable to promote Product 1 and it may also be 
preferable for Products 2 and 4 to withdraw from 
the market, then at a glance, no problem arises from 
the subsidy giving competitive advantage to Product 
1. However, the other products create a competitive 
environment and exert market pressure to lower 
prices. Thus, if the other products are placed at 
a disadvantage and forced to withdraw from the 
market, the remaining products can increase their 
prices. From the above reasoning, we find that the 
subsidy has two functions: (i) promote subsidized 
products, and (ii) raise the subsidized products’ 
prices.
The opt imal  subsidy pol icy presented in 
Proposition 3 considers the above two functions 
and shows the condit ion of  decreasing the 
number of products to ef fectively promote the 
socially preferable product. That is, when a 
positive externality is relatively small, by keeping 
the number of products as the status quo, the 
government can improve the social welfare in 
a competitive environment. On the other hand, 
when the positive externality is relatively large, 
the government improves social welfare not by 
utilizing a competitive environment featuring many 
products, but by forcing the other products to 
withdraw from the market so that only the socially 
preferable product remains. When the positive 
externality has an intermediate value, then while 
the government decreases the number of products 
so as to promote socially preferable products, the 
competitive environment is still utilized with the 
two remaining products. That is, in this case, the 
government improves social welfare by balancing 
these two functions.
　6.　Discussion
When the government executes a subsidy policy 
in the real world, it may be dif ficult to balance 
those two functions. Because the government 
may concentrate on promoting socially preferable 
products, it may ignore social views regarding 
the cost-effectiveness of promoting the products. 
That is, if the government justifies driving rival 
products from the market and also justifies 
granting a subsidy to purchasers of preferable 
product, it may ignore the problem of a large price 
increase in the subsidized product. In this case, 
the government may have to grant an excessive 
subsidy. Furthermore, this causes other products 
to withdraw from the market, and the remaining 
products obtain excessive profit. As a result, social 
welfare may not be improved. In some cases, social 
welfare may in fact deteriorate compared to that of 
the status quo. This can be easily understood by the 
following proposition.
Proposition 4. If the government grants a subsidy 
when the positive externality is less than the range 
presented in Proposition 3 while the amount of 
subsidy is that given in Proposition 3, social welfare 
may decline compared to that of the status quo.
Proof. For example, when the government grants a 
subsidy s a3=  to create a market with two products, 
if , ( ) / ( . ) ,a t t0 1 2 8 0 0518! - + = i7 which is 
less than the range / ( . ), / ,a t t t13 80 0 1625 4! = g6
social welfare is lower than that of the status quo. 
 Q.E.D.
As already have explained, if the government 
grants an excessive subsidy, the number of 
products in the market may significantly decreased, 
while prices of the remaining products increase 
excessively. Furthermore, if an excessive subsidy 
is granted, entr y of potential new products 
into the market may be deterred; this causes 
a substantial spread of the socially preferable 
product. It is possible to analyze the withdrawal of 
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products caused by the subsidy empirically using 
market data. However, it is difficult to analyze the 
deterrence facing potential new products into the 
market because no data can be collected in terms 
of such a situation. From the above, it is necessary 
to pay full attention to a subsidy policy aiming to 
improve social welfare by promoting preferable 
products because the government may focus on 
the spread of socially preferable products without 
considering the welfare effect of such subsidies. 
That is, the government has to keep in mind the 
problem of missing products.
Arakawa (2011) discusses welfare ef fects of 
the tax break system for Kei Cars in Japan. He 
shows that socially preferable products tend to 
be undersupplied. He proposes a solution for this 
problem whereby levying small amount of tax on 
socially preferable products enables the government 
to improve social welfare. Furthermore, he also 
shows that tax breaks for special category products 
such as Kei Cars in Japan may erode social welfare. 
This occurs because a tax break for a cer tain 
product categor y may undermine or eliminate 
incentives to improve the product (i.e., product 
innovation), or deter potential new products 
belonging to the other categories. This situation has 
to be analyzed from a viewpoint of the problem of 
missing products. 
　7.　Conclusion
This paper analyzed the optimal subsidy policy 
under monopolistic competition. The optimal 
subsidy has to rise in conjunction with the degree 
of positive externality exer ted by the socially 
preferable product. Granting a subsidy induces 
other products to withdraw from the market, 
creating a situation where the market suf fers 
declining product variety. Thus, while the subsidy 
has a function of spreading socially preferable 
products, it also has a function of calming a 
competitive environment by the decreasing 
number of products in the market. As a result, the 
subsidy increases prices of the subsidized product. 
Therefore, the government has to increases the 
subsidy amount, leading the social cost of funding 
the subsidy to rise as well. This result shows 
that an excessive subsidy decreases the number 
of products to an excessive extent, and this 
unnecessarily lowered competitive environment 
increases the subsidized product’s price. That is, 
the subsidy policy induces the problem of missing 
products.
This paper utilized the concept of horizontal 
product dif ferentiation wherein products are 
differentiated via characteristics. The situation in 
which purchasers of socially preferable product 
are subsidized was analyzed. In this case, no 
products except the subsidized product have 
socially preferable product characteristics—that 
is, no difference exists between the other products 
from a social viewpoint. However, in the automobile 
industry, the government grants a subsidy on cars 
with excellent environmental performance, while all 
cars are differentiated with respect to environmental 
performance and they can be ranked according to 
environmental performances. That is, in general, 
all products are dif ferentiated with respect to 
their qualities and the government (i) levies a tax, 
the amount of which reflects product qualities or 
(ii) grants a subsidy according to the products’ 
qualities. By considering these situations together 
with the concept of vertical product differentiation, 
we can discuss a subsidy policy aiming to improve 
overall product quality in an industry. In this case, 
similar to this paper, we can discuss the subsidy 
policy from the viewpoint of the problem of missing 
products in a vertically differentiated, rather than 
horizontally differentiated, market. This is a future 
problem.
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Notes
1)  Kleven and Waseem (2013) theoretically analyze 
relationship between a taxation system with tax 
brackets and product innovation. 
2)  Products are horizontally dif ferentiated if 
they consist of dif ferent characteristics, and 
consumer preferences are reflected in demand 
for these products. Thus, if dif ferent products 
are sold at the same price, each product has non-
zero demand. On the other hand, products are 
vertically differentiated if they consist of different 
product qualities, and all consumers have same 
preference ranking for the products. Therefore, 
if all products are sold at same price, only the 
product with highest quality incurs demand.
3)  In the monopolistic competition model proposed 
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), all firms compete 
directly with other firms. Because they do not 
consider product location, their model is called 
a non-address model, while the model of Salop 
(1979) is called an address model.
4)  Note that if we assume a subsidy amount 
determined as a proportion of product price, the 
conclusion does not change in this setting. For 
further details, see Salanie (2011) and Arakawa 
13Arakawa：Optimal Subsidy Policy and Missing Products under Monopolistic Competition
(2012).
5)  We can prove this by substituting the subsidy 
amount into the equilibrium prices of equations 
(2),(8),(4), and (10), and comparing the prices. 
6)  Because the subsidy granted on Product 1 has 
social value, there may be no problem if the 
funds used to provide the subsidy is collected 
from the entire society. Thus, we do not consider 
this specific method in this paper.
7)  Because there is only Product 1 in the market, all 
consumers buy Product 1 and obtain the subsidy. 
Thus, the subsidy does not af fect consumer 
behavior and the cost of funds used to provide 
the subsidy and the social cost cancel each 
other. Furthermore, because all consumers buy 
Product 1, the prices of Products 1 and 3 cancel 
each other. Therefore, the subsidy amount 
and price of Product 1 do not appear in the SW 
function.
8)  In this paper, we call the optimal subsidy policy 
a social-welfare-maximizing policy within the 
framework of a competitive economy in which 
firms determine product prices.
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